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(c) The Canton merchant, as opposed to the labouring class, is in power
at the time.
If either of the first two conditions are not fulfilled, the effectiveness of the blockade will be reduced accordingly, and if the third is not fulfilled, in the opinion of Sir Reginald Stubbs, the blockade would probably be ineffective."
33.
In connection with condition (a) above, of the two rice crops harvested in the year 1926, the first crop exceeded the previous one by 60 per cent. and was the best for many years, while the second crop was only 25 per cent. below normal. The inference is that local supplies of rice are fairly adequate.
As regards condition (c), we understand that Chen is supported mainly by the labouring class.
General Remarks on the effect of Economic Pressure against South China.
34. In the circumstances, we are considering, viz., a state of war; a blockade of South China could probably be made effective so far as the sea is concerned. The opinion of the Chinese experts is that even such an effective external blockade would produce very little influence on the Cantonese, and that they could quite well get on without any foreign trade, as indeed they did during the 18th Century.
Munitions.
35. It would seem that the only item the stoppage of which might have a real effect on the Cantonese is munitions. They are at present very largely dependent on sea-borne supplies, and if these supplies were cut off the Cantonese would then be dependent on-
(i.) The small arsenal at Canton and the larger one at Hanyang, whose com-
bined output is understood to be about--
Mountain and field guns: 6 per year; Infantry support guns: 12 per month; Light automatics: 20 per month; Heavy M.G.'s: 28 per month;
Rifles 225 a day.
S.A.A. 140,000 rounds per day;
also powder and automatic pistols.
(ii) Leakage from North China and French Indo-China.
It is, however, impossible to state with accuracy the output of the Arsenals- affected as it might be by the stoppage of the import of raw material--or the extent of the leakage from North China and French Indo-China, nor is any reliable infor- mation available as to the stocks now held by the Cantonese on which naturally depends the effect of cutting off supplies. But we understand that the demand for munitions on the part of the Cantonese is very great.
Internal Trade.
36. As regards internal trade, which is greater in volume and importance than foreign trade, this trade would, temporarily, be seriously diminished by the complete cessation of coastal traffic and by the stoppage of traffic up and down the Yangtse and Canton Rivers. But, in the opinion of the experts on China, it would be impossible to prevent leakage across these rivers a leakage which in course of time would become a steady stream. Further, at certain seasons, viz., at "low river,” our ships would be unable to operate on the Yangtse above Wuhu for the purpose of preventing across-river trade, which would thus have a practically clear field. For the country north of the Yangtse below Wuhu the normal channels of distribution are the Tientsin-Pukow Railway, the Yangtse itself, canals, creeks and, to a limited extent, land routes. The country south of the Yangtse below Wuhu is served by the Shanghai-Nanking Railway and by the other means of communication described above. Above Wuhu, in the north, distribution is effected by the Peking-Hankow Railway and by rivers, canals and roads. On the south side the main channels of communication are the Hankow-Changsha Railway, the great lakes and the other methods already described.
37. We are also informed that, sooner or later, trade would find its way down to other ports in the North as well as in the South, and it would therefore be necessary
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to blockade these ports, North and South. We understand that this can be done, since there is not a large number which can accommodate steamers. But this at once leads us to a consideration of North China, an area which we have referred to in paragraph 20 as the outer provinces and Tientsin.' It is the very strong view of all the Chinese experts that if we find ourselves at war with, or even carrying out a Pacific Blockade against, South China, the North would certainly have to throw in their lot with the South. Some of the recent statements of Chang-tso-lin do not, however, appear to confirm this view.
38.
Tientsin and the North.
The following table shows the trade of Tientsin in the year 1925 in millions of Haikwan Taels :-
Imports-
Foreign goods, gross
110-3
Chinese produce, chiefly from Hankow, Shanghai,
Canton and Foochow
80-9
Exports-
Chinese produce to foreign countries
61-7
Chinese produce to Chinese ports
38-2
291.1
at 3s. 53d. equals approximately £51,000,000.
The trade is generally similar to that of Shanghai, making allowance for a cold climate and the general absence of Chinese manufactures.
39. The effectiveness of any maritime action directed against trade with Tientsin and the North, must depend largely on naval considerations. Not only is the whole of Manchuria saturated with Japanese industrial and economic influence. but it should also be remembered that the direct railway communication between Manchuria and Japan through Corea is controlled by the Japanese.
It seems incredible to think that the Japanese would not maintain their economic and military interests in this region. It may be mentioned as an illustration of the preponderance of Japanese influence in this district that, of the total number of extra-territorial nationals in China 98.4 per cent. are Japanese, of which by far the greater part are resident in Manchuria.
Munitions.
40. As regards munitions, North China-particularly Manchuria is much better able to supply her own requirements than is any other part of China. At Mukden, there is a recently completed and fully equipped arsenal, comparable with almost any modern European one. Its maximum output is understood to be :-
Rifles 90 per day (to be shortly increased to 250 a day). S.A.A.: 300,000 rounds per day.
77-m.m. guns: 8 per month.
150 m.m. Howitzers: 4-6 per month.
37-m.m. Infantry support guns: 30 per month.
Machine guns :
per day.
It must also be remembered that a railway connection still exists and is working between Peking and Siberia (viâ Tientsin-Mukden-Harbin) and that a practicable though difficult motor route exists from Peking through Urga to the Siberian frontier, so that, as far as North China is concerned, an alternative source of supply of military essentials from Russia might conceivably exist. The maximum capacity of the motor route through Urga is, however, at present only 125 tons a week, and this capacity is seriously affected by snow in winter and by thaw in spring.
41. It is to be noted. also, that the Peking-Mukden-Harbin-Trans-Siberian railway route passes through Tientsin, where an International Force of some 4,000-5,000 is normally stationed. Moreover, at Peking itself, there are the Legation guards. It is not within the province of this Report to discuss whether part or all of these military centres would remain in situ during a general anti-British military offensive throughout China. Even if they were withdrawn, there are important railway bridges on either side of Tientsin; were these effectively destroyed before evacuation, the railway could be put out of action to an extent which would not be reparable by the Chinese without foreign guidance.
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